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Establishing Theater Command and Control  
In a Coalition of Nations:  
Requirements For U.S. Doctrine

A Monograph  
by  
Major Barry A Maxwell  
Infantry



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School of Advanced Military Studies  
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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

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## ABSTRACT

**ESTABLISHING THEATER COMMAND AND CONTROL IN A COALITION OF NATIONS: REQUIREMENTS FOR US DOCTRINE** by Major Barry A Maxwell, USA, 50 pages.

Most conflicts involving the US, especially during the 20th century, have been newly formed coalition affairs, and US operations with other nations are likely to be the norm in the future. Such coalition partners may well be very different from the US. With limited or no alliance arrangements between the US and many potential partners, the establishment of theater command and control among diverse nations becomes an important consideration in coalition operations.

This study examines what further US doctrine is needed concerning the establishment of theater command and control (C<sup>2</sup>) in a coalition of nations. The answer is sought by examining why such doctrine is useful and by looking at historical US coalitions with major partners: the British in World War II, the Republic of Korea in the Korean War, and Saudi Arabia in Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Each coalition pair is examined to determine the extent of similarities between them in terms of conflicting political, cultural and military problems and objectives of coalition partners; differing logistical capabilities; and differing armaments, training and doctrine of each armed force. The nature of the theater C<sup>2</sup> structures used and the mechanisms for dealing with differences between partners in each coalition are investigated. Next, the study surveys current US coalition C<sup>2</sup> doctrine, looking for useful guidelines to help future theater commanders establish C<sup>2</sup> in specific situations.

Coalition doctrine is lacking in useful detail, especially for other than combined C<sup>2</sup> structures and resulting coordination and liaison challenges. History does, however, offer models of theater C<sup>2</sup> structures that are potentially applicable for future situations. This applicability may be facilitated for the theater C<sup>2</sup> planner by providing a doctrinal framework for assessing coalition partner similarity as a guide for tailoring C<sup>2</sup> structures for specific situations. The Spectrum of Similarity Model is proposed for this purpose, and recommendations for improving doctrine are made.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

This study examines what further US doctrine is needed concerning the establishment of theater command and control (C<sup>2</sup>) in a coalition of nations. The answer is sought by examining why such doctrine is useful and by looking at historical coalitions involving the US and major wartime partners, as well as the resulting C<sup>2</sup> structures. Next, the study surveys current US coalition C<sup>2</sup> doctrine, looking for useful guidelines to help future theater commanders establish C<sup>2</sup> in specific situations.

Coalition doctrine is lacking in useful detail. History does, however, offer models of theater C<sup>2</sup> structures that are potentially applicable for future situations. This applicability may be facilitated for the theater C<sup>2</sup> planner by providing a doctrinal framework for assessing coalition partner similarity as a guide for tailoring C<sup>2</sup> structures for specific situations.

### COALITIONS AND COMMAND AND CONTROL DOCTRINE

A coalition may be defined as an informal agreement (as contrasted with a formal alliance) for common action in one occasion or effort, or longer cooperation in a narrow sector of interest.<sup>1</sup> When newly formed, a coalition may be immature and lack much or all established structure and procedure for member nations to operate together. Extensive experience in operating with each other may also be lacking.

Most conflicts involving the US, especially during the 20th century, have been coalition affairs, as they were not conducted

with previously existing alliances. World Wars I and II, Korea, Vietnam, and Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM all began as coalitions for the US, and relatively immature ones at that. Of the two major post World War II US alliances, neither NATO nor the Republic of Korea (ROK)-US Combined Forces Command (CFC) have fought a war since their establishment.

US operations with other nations are likely to be the norm in the future. US joint doctrine uses words such as "good probability" and "frequently" to describe the likelihood of multinational operations.<sup>2</sup> A recent CFC Commander in Chief, General Louis Menetrey, stated that future US military operations will very likely be part of a coalition effort.<sup>3</sup> Threats to the US are becoming increasingly diverse while US military force structure is being reduced, so coalition operations may be necessary to achieve needed military capability. Most places of US interest in the world, beyond NATO, Korea and Japan, have limited or no formal military alliance arrangements with the US. Conflicts involving the US in such areas will include operations with friendly nations for which few procedures exist, a central issue in the study of coalitions.

There are many areas in which coalitions must establish procedures to facilitate interoperability. One is host nation support agreements for logistical support. Another is procedures for basing rights and usage. And yet another, the focus of this study, is an operational military C<sup>2</sup> structure for coalition forces.



Compared to the US, coalition partners may have less developed or smaller militaries that do not have the experience and capabilities for large scale operations such as those envisioned in AirLand Battle. These partners may also have cultures, religions, languages and political situations that are very diverse from those of the US, making it more difficult and time consuming to establish effective coalition relations.

Given the above, US doctrine for coalition theater C<sup>2</sup> must go beyond the established alliances such as NATO and CFC, and address coalition operations with nonalliance partners. Concepts are needed to assist theater commanders in quickly establishing coalition theater C<sup>2</sup> structures which are adapted to the peculiarities of new coalitions. These C<sup>2</sup> structures must promote confidence and positive self esteem among the partners, and at the same time be effective in operation.

#### METHODOLOGY

This study looks at coalitions in light of the allied experiences of a senior commander in World War II. General Jacob Devers' "Major Problems Confronting a Theater Commander in Combined Operations", provides useful insights into such an examination.<sup>4</sup> Careful reading of his work suggests that these problems arise largely from a lack of similarity between the coalition partners. Such dissimilarity may have much to do with the nature of C<sup>2</sup> structures used in the past, and may provide guidelines for future C<sup>2</sup> structures.

Three of General Devers' problem areas seem most appropriate for a study of doctrine for coalition C<sup>2</sup> structures at the theater level. These problem areas are: conflicting political, cultural and military problems and objectives of coalition partners; differing logistical capabilities; and differing armaments, training and doctrine of each armed force.<sup>5</sup> These areas will be used as a point of departure for subsequent analysis.

This study begins with an examination of historical US coalitions with major partners: the British in World War II, the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the Korean War, and Saudi Arabia in Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM. These partners were chosen because in their respective wars they had the most extensive coalition relationship with the US. Each coalition pair is examined to determine the extent of similarities between them in terms of General Devers' three problems areas. The nature of the theater C<sup>2</sup> structures used and the mechanisms for dealing with differences between partners in each coalition are investigated. Resulting problems and successes are noted.

With historical information at hand, the problems and successes of these historical coalitions are compared with current US doctrine on coalition C<sup>2</sup> to analyze the extent to which this doctrine would promote similar successes and avoid similar problems in the future. This study then addresses deficiencies in doctrine and evaluates the potential for a more detailed model for determining future coalition theater C<sup>2</sup> structures.

## II. HISTORICAL US COALITIONS

### WORLD WAR II AND GREAT BRITAIN

As coalition partners, the US and Great Britain were relatively similar, and could look upon each other as equals. Both nations had strong, democratic governments and each nation's respective public opinion supported both its government and its war effort. At the end of 1941, when the US officially entered the war, neither nation was facing imminent invasion. While Great Britain was more hard pressed than the US (such as by German submarine warfare), there was still enough symmetry between the two in terms of needs and perceived threats that neither government felt unduly threatened by the coalition relationship, nor helplessly dependent upon the other.

The political and military objectives of the two nations were similar. They agreed on the overriding need for military defeat and unconditional surrender of both Germany and Japan, and with the priority of effort against Germany. This agreement allowed the coalition to transcend smaller disagreements on the ways of doing so, such as the timing of the cross-channel invasion, the efforts to be made in the Mediterranean, and the importance of reopening Burma for the supply of China. The US also had misgivings about Great Britain's postwar retention of colonies, but these feelings were not so strong as to cause significant discord within the coalition.

The American and British cultures and languages were very similar. Both derived from relatively common roots, and while there were subtle differences, they were not so pronounced as to cause significant problems. Personnel could communicate directly and immediately. After only a short time, differences could be learned and accounted for, with neither side having to make a disproportionate effort to do so.

Related to the shared cultural heritage is a common religious history. Both nations were predominantly Judeo-Christian in background, with attendant common values and beliefs. This included some toleration for similar religions.

As for logistic capability, both societies were industrially and technologically modern, with mechanization widespread among the populations. Many people of both nations were used to and relatively comfortable with operating and maintaining automobiles and machinery. There was no significant disparity in mechanical ability between personnel of the two nations.

Subject to the availability of raw materials, both nations had the knowledge and ability to produce much or all of the materiel needed to supply their war efforts. Both could design and manufacture their own aircraft, naval vessels and armored vehicles, as well as the means to support and move them. While Great Britain received considerable assistance from the US, the British were nonetheless not completely dependent on the US for any major aspect of their military structure.

While specific procedures were often different, the logistic systems of each nation were similar enough to allow significant cooperative efforts and sharing of materiel. The most notable examples were the British use of US destroyers, Sherman tanks and landing craft. While the administrative and supply sections, even in the otherwise combined staffs, were generally separate, this did not prevent theater level decisions on logistic priorities. The most famous example is General Eisenhower's controversial decision during the pursuit across France in the summer of 1944 to give priority, especially for fuel and transport, to Montgomery's army group in the north rather than Bradley's in the south.

Great Britain and the US both had militaries that were increasingly capable of large scale modern warfare in worldwide theaters of operations. While the British had some two years more experience in combat, both militaries were designed for expected joint service and combined arms operations over great distances. Both were expanding already large offensive naval and air forces, as well as large armies with significant armor, artillery, and infantry capabilities. While there would be differences in detail, both militaries were similar in overall capability and potential for large operational level actions.

The Anglo-American coalition opted for a succession of combined theater C<sup>2</sup> structures that were used to execute major operations from TORCH in 1942 to OVERLORD in 1944. While each C<sup>2</sup> structure was a bit different, there were common characteristics. The commands were unified under single commanders and had

Integrated British and US staffs that were usually balanced numerically. As a further indicator of interoperability, the commanders and staff principals usually had deputies from the other nation.<sup>1</sup>

This integrated combined staff produced several benefits. One was, in General Eisenhower's words, "to keep out of Allied headquarters any possibility that a subject was going to be decided upon nationalistic lines."<sup>2</sup> The other nation's staff officers would not easily let such actions pass, which kept issues on a more objective basis. It also engendered more trust by subordinate units, as well as at higher political levels, because issues were more likely to be decided on their merits than by national parochialism.<sup>3</sup>

Another benefit was the exchange of expertise between the two nations' command and staff members. This exchange in combined staffs was the primary translation mechanism for working out national dissimilarities between coalition partners before they could unduly trouble subordinate units. Such staffs could make appropriate adjustments and compensations in the conduct of the C<sup>2</sup> functions of planning, directing, controlling and coordinating so that proper missions, instructions and assistance could be given to subordinate national units.

The combined theater C<sup>2</sup> structures used were also set up for unity of command, historically not a strong area in coalitions. General Eisenhower, who commanded in most of these structures, had early obtained backing from the British government that made it

less likely that subordinate British commanders would bypass him and appeal his decisions directly to the British government. This backing grew as his reputation became more firmly established.<sup>4</sup>

There were problems, such as personality conflicts with Montgomery, jealousy over publicity, and coordination that could have been better, especially early in the war. However, these did not become so serious as to endanger the coalition or the ultimate successful prosecution of the war.

#### KOREAN WAR AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Upon entering a coalition in June of 1950 to counter the north Korean invasion of south Korea, the US and ROK were relatively dissimilar, and by most measures of national power would not be considered equals. By 1945, forty years of ruthless Japanese occupation of Korea (1905-1945) had left the latter with no indigenous governmental, military or police institutions and little experience in these areas.<sup>5</sup> Korea's economy was left mostly undeveloped and unevenly distributed on the peninsula. The ROK government, created from United Nations (UN) supervised elections, was only two years old, and its Army was functionally little older when the war began.

The very existence of the ROK was directly and immediately threatened by the massive north Korean invasion. The ROK Army, outnumbered, ill-equipped, under-trained, and led by inexperienced officers and NCOs, was quickly proving unable to resist this invasion on its own. Without outside help, the ROK would probably

have been overrun by the end of July 1950. The ROK was therefore completely dependent upon US military support and direction for its survival, while the far away US was not so threatened.

Cultural differences between the US and the ROK were significant. Korean customs and the Confucian ethic were very different from the West, and while Christianity was not unknown, the predominant religion was the non-western Buddhism. Perhaps one of the most significant aspects was the great importance of "face", or prestige and standing in the eyes of others. Senior commanders, wishing to avoid the appearance that they needed help from personnel junior to them on their staffs, might not ask for or allow advice and input to plans. This problem affected US advisors who, as well as being foreigners, were usually junior in both rank and age to those they were advising. Reporting of bad news, implying as it did that someone (either the superior or subordinate) had failed, was at times also inhibited.<sup>6</sup>

The language difference too was substantial. The Korean language, Hangul, is related to Chinese, but with its own alphabet, one that bears no resemblance to English characters. Hangul was undeveloped in both military and technical terminology, having been forbidden for use during the Japanese occupation (which had also resulted in a low literacy rate). For example, there were no terms for machinegun or headlight, and Koreans had to develop descriptive phrases such as "gun-that-shoots-very-fast" and "candle-in-a-shiny-bowl."<sup>7</sup> These were often not standard, and a dictionary of military terminology had not been completed by



June 1950.<sup>8</sup> Furthermore, few Americans, including the US Military Advisory Group to the ROK (KMAG) advisors, learned Hangul.<sup>9</sup>

Logistical capability was very limited for the ROK. It could produce little of its needed war materiel and its people were relatively inexperienced in mechanization. With no past experience in such matters, it had serious problems administering and maintaining what it received from its virtual sole source: the US.<sup>10</sup> The US also supplied substantial assistance with this through the KMAG, setting up and helping the ROK Army run logistic systems, and controlling which materiel the Koreans received.<sup>11</sup> Shortly after the war began, the Eighth US Army (EUSA) became responsible for the logistic support of the ROK Army.<sup>12</sup>

This support included theater level decisions about where, or if, materiel was distributed. During the summer of 1950, ROK Army units were in competition with US units for limited materiel stocked in Japan, and the US units were given priority.<sup>13</sup> In May 1951, President Rhee had asked for equipment to equip up to ten more ROK divisions. Lieutenant General James Van Fleet, then the EUSA commander, supported by Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgeway, then the UNC commander, had this request blocked. General Van Fleet felt that the ROK Army could not effectively utilize such equipment until ROK Army leadership improved and their units were no longer abandoning so much of what they already had.<sup>14</sup>

As with the ROK logistic system, the ROK military's armaments, training and doctrine came, with many limitations, from the US. The ROK Army (for the ROK had very little in the way of

an air force or a navy) consisted of eight understrength and ill-trained infantry divisions averaging 8000 men each, with no tanks, no artillery heavier than short range (7250 yards) 105mm howltzers (only five battalions or 89 of these weapons systems) and only a handful of armored cars.<sup>15</sup> By US design prior to the Korean war, the ROK Army was to be trained and equipped to maintain internal security, while deterring attacks from north of the 38th Parallel.<sup>16</sup>

The ROK Army and its officers had little training and no experience in modern high intensity combined arms warfare, much less in joint operations with ground, air and naval forces. For example, the US-advised ROK Army Command and General Staff College opened less than a year prior to the war. Additionally, only a few ROK officers had attended US Army schools, so few commanders and staff had any formal training.<sup>17</sup> As of June 1950, less than 25 percent of ROK Army battalions had completed unit level training and were ready to move on to regimental level training.<sup>18</sup> Little more than a constabulary (its earlier primary function), the ROK Army and its officers' main experience had been in small scale border and internal security incidents. It was therefore much more limited in scope and ability than the US Army.

The theater coalition C<sup>2</sup> structure consisted of US commanders and their staffs exercising unilateral operational C<sup>2</sup> over all coalition forces. This is perhaps understandable for those UN forces other than the US, as they were a relatively small part militarily, comprising barely more than five percent of the total

UN contingent.<sup>19</sup> The ground units were usually subordinate to US Army divisions as shown in Figure 1.<sup>20</sup> The ROK Army (not considered a UN force) provided more ground force personnel than any other nation, and usually more than all others combined.<sup>21</sup> This, plus the fact that the ROK Air Force and Navy were all but insignificant, are the reasons for focusing on the main component of the Korean theater coalition C<sup>2</sup> structure: the ROK Army-EUSA relationship.




FIGURE 1. EIGHTH ARMY COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS, 1 JULY 1951.

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The ROK Army spent the war under the command of EUSA. This began on 17 July 1950 when ROK President Rhee placed the ROK Army under the command of UN Command (UNC) Commander General Douglas MacArthur, who in turn placed it under the EUSA Commander, Lieutenant General Walton Walker.<sup>22</sup> The ROK Army Chief of Staff received orders from EUSA and issued orders to the appropriate ROK

Army units to do what EUSA required. This procedure worked well and was followed unless a ROK unit was under the operational command of a US corps, in which case the ROK Army did not become involved for operational matters.<sup>23</sup> This began with the ROK 1st Division attachment to US I Corps in September 1950, with similar attachments following thereafter. By July 1951, six of nine ROK divisions were attached to US corps (see Figure 1).

KMAG was a key part of the ROK Army-EUSA coalition C<sup>2</sup> relationship in two ways. The first was by maintaining liaison between the ROK Army and EUSA. This was facilitated by KMAG HQ locating with the ROK Army HQ and included keeping General Walker advised and ensuring his directives were carried out.<sup>24</sup> It also included establishing a separate communications system to link KMAG advisors in ROK units, providing a backup means for the flow of information and directives. This was especially important because of problems with ROK Army unit communications, language difficulties, and cultural and experience problems with accurate reporting.<sup>25</sup> KMAG advisors, often assigned down to battalion level in ROK units, were a main source of information to the US commanders on ROK unit activities and status.<sup>26</sup>

KMAG's second contribution was as the coalition C<sup>2</sup> translation mechanism. With no combined staff to act as such a mechanism as there had been in World War II, KMAG, under the command of EUSA, served this purpose by bridging the differences between the US and ROK armies. KMAG advisors, who had no legal command authority, were to persuade, provide guidance, suggestions

and assistance in helping their ROK counterparts make sense of what the US was trying to do.<sup>27</sup> KMAG knew the capabilities and limitations of the ROK Army better than any other US organization and was best suited to get the most out of it. The disparity in experience, training and ability between the EUSA staff and the ROK Army staff was so great that an attempt to operate as a combined staff would likely have been disastrous.

KMAG was therefore instrumental in facilitating EUSA's exercising of C<sup>2</sup> over the ROK Army without the use of a combined staff. KMAG helped get information needed for planning by EUSA, and helped disseminate the EUSA directives. It also gave advice and assistance to the ROK Army for implementing these directives, provided feedback on ROK unit status needed for controlling their actions, and conducted coordination to increase the likelihood of successful operations.

Though instrumental, there was a problem with KMAG's ability to execute wartime advisory, assistance and liaison missions. KMAG was never originally planned, manned, or equipped for these operational wartime missions, much less for a much expanded ROK Army. It did well with what it could find, but there were never enough KMAG advisors and communications equipment to cover the needed levels of ROK command. The advisors they had were not always suitable due to rank, experience and temperament.<sup>28</sup>

Still, the ROK-US coalition was rather successful. It defeated the north Korean forces, stalemated the Chinese forces along a line farther north than the original 38th Parallel and

generally met the US objective of containing communism. This coalition matured into a full alliance, still viable 40 years later in the ROK-US Combined Forces Command.

#### OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM AND SAUDI ARABIA

There were a number of differing political and military needs between the US and Saudi Arabia. One was the stability of the Saudi government. Ruling by tradition, the ability to protect holy sites, especially from infidels, was a key aspect of the government's legitimacy. Letting foreign military forces in, especially from non-Islamic nations, showed a certain weakness or inability to protect things independently. Concerns over the appearance of sovereignty and a need to show independence from foreign powers were especially touchy subjects given recent imperialist legacies of the Ottoman and later the British Empires. The presence of western forces was a risk to the Saudi government and a westerner commanding the entire operation would have raised that risk even further.<sup>29</sup>

The imminency of the threat to Saudi Arabia was not enough to override these concerns. Invasion of Saudi Arabia by Iraq was not in progress, but was merely a potentially threatening event. Saudi Arabia did need massive military help to deter such an invasion, but US oil interests in the region and the need for Saudi Arabia as a platform for military operations against Iraq, left a certain symmetry of need and dependence for both partners.

Saudi Arabia was not so immediately threatened that it had to let the US be completely in charge.

A corollary to the question of Saudi governmental stability was a concern about the military and royal family members as sources of coups. Such coups are endemic to the Middle East and affect how militaries are structured.<sup>30</sup> The Saudi military is such an organization, with compartmentalization of the Saudi land, air and naval forces, as well as the National Guard and the Interior Ministry (which includes the Frontier Forces). The first three meet at the Ministry of Defense and Aviation (MODA), but the latter two report directly to the King, where the lines of communication all meet. Coordination and communication between these organizations is therefore limited.<sup>31</sup>

Cultural differences between Saudi Arabia and the US are significant. One is the Islamic religion, with the manifestation in Saudi Arabia of legislated restrictions on women's activities, alcohol, entertainment and diet, as well as prescribed punishments that may seem brutal to westerners. There is also a wariness of outsiders, especially non-Muslims, who might bring influences and ideas disturbing to tradition, society and their religion.

Related to this is the great importance Saudi's place on the role of personal relationships as a necessity for working together. They are less comfortable and less willing to work with someone that they do not know, and with whom they have not established a considerable amount of trust.<sup>32</sup> Operations in Saudi

organizations, such as the government and the military tend to be along these lines rather than mandated wiring diagrams.<sup>33</sup>

A third aspect is the Saudi importance of pride, similar to the Korean concern about "face" discussed previously. One US Army Middle East Foreign Area Officer that has served in both nations has suggested that it is an even more central force for Saudi behavior than for the Koreans.<sup>34</sup> The effects were similar in terms of the desire to avoid the appearance of failure and inability, bringing about sometimes less than accurate reporting and avoidance of requests and issues rather than have to say "no."

The language difference too is substantial. Unlike English and European languages, Arabic does not share common characters with the alphabets of those languages. It is not an easy language for Americans to either learn, or maintain fluency. Fortunately, Arabic has been more developed in technical terms than Hangu was in 1950, and English is more widely used in Saudi Arabia.

In terms of logistic capability, Saudi Arabia has a number of strengths. It has significant capacity for production, refining and transportation of petroleum fuels. It also produced most of the needed water through desalinization. Saudi Arabian seaport and airhead capacity and infrastructure were significant, although roads in the forward areas had some limitations. Probably the most important factor was the availability of substantial money to commercially contract for whatever support was needed.

This last point also shows a major limitation: that the Saudis were lacking in much indigenous logistic capability. They



did not internally produce either major weapons systems or the capability to maintain them. Much of their logistic system was run by foreigners. The Saudis were therefore dependent on external suppliers for what they used.

Despite receiving much of their equipment and training from the US, the Saudi military was relatively dissimilar from the US military. One aspect was its relatively small size: the Saudi military only contained some 550 tanks, 2700 armored vehicles, 189 combat aircraft, and 97,000 men in military service.<sup>35</sup> Ground forces were organized in several brigade or smaller size units, and were also divided between the separate organizations of the Royal Saudi Land Forces (RSLF), the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG) and the Interior Ministry. These three organizations are kept distinctly separate from each other, perhaps avoiding the possibility of too much military power in a single hierarchy.

Saudi armed forces consist of a set of units designed for dispersed operations, primarily for internal security and defense against small border incursions. There are no tactical organizations above the brigade level, such as divisions or corps, and no tactical communications systems for those higher levels. There was also no experience at such levels, the Saudi military being relatively new and never having fought a major mid- or high-intensity conflict.

The Saudi and US militaries worked in a theater coalition C<sup>2</sup> structure that had two separate, parallel lines of command and no overall commander. The Saudis, heading the Joint Forces Command

(JFC), which was commanded by Lieutenant General Khalid bin Sultan, had operational command of forces from the Islamic nations of the coalition. The US Central Command (CENTCOM), commanded by General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, had a similar relationship with non-Islamic forces in the coalition.

Concerned about potential unity of command problems between the two separate organizations, unity of effort became a priority. The two commanders met almost daily for briefings and coordination to ensure agreement on what was to be done. These meetings were preceded and followed by supporting coordination between the two commanders' staffs.

A central feature of this coordination was the Coalition Coordination, Communication and Integration Center, which came to be known as the C<sup>3</sup>IC. It was built on an ad hoc basis by the US Army CENTCOM (ARCENT) Vice Commander, Major General Paul Schwartz, shortly after the crisis began.<sup>36</sup> C<sup>3</sup>IC was, as the name implies, to provide a coordinating and integrating staff of US and Saudi functional area specialists to interface between the US CENTCOM staff and the Saudi headed JFC.

C<sup>3</sup>IC was to ensure that both staffs were working from common information and understood where each was headed in planning and operations. It was not a directive or decision making body, but did help clarify and pass directives.<sup>37</sup> C<sup>3</sup>IC performed other C<sup>2</sup> functions by conducting coordination, facilitating operations and by providing information to CENTCOM for planning and controlling

purposes. The Saudi half of C<sup>3</sup>IC was also, in effect, acting as General Khalid's theater staff for JFC.<sup>38</sup>

The organization of C<sup>3</sup>IC was along the functional lines of a Joint Operations Center (JOC). There were positions for the navy, air force, air defense, ground operations (including the Marine Corps), intelligence, special forces and logistics. Each position had one or two officers from both countries for each of two 12 hour shifts, who in addition to their coordination and information sharing efforts, kept situation maps and unit status.<sup>39</sup>

As C<sup>3</sup>IC members worked together during the fall of 1990, the Saudis and Americans learned of each other's military needs and procedures, and formed the personal relationships and trust so important to productively operating and coordinating with the Saudis. This had been one of General Schwartz' objectives in having Saudis and American desk officers work closely together, and in having these officers alternate the daily responsibility for briefing General Khalid. This concentration of well-developed Saudi-American working relationships, which covered the required joint functional areas, produced an interface with the Saudi system available for outside agencies to tap into for information or for the purpose of working an action. For example, a US action officer from ARCENT, who did not know the Saudis, could make use of existing relationships at the C<sup>3</sup>IC to gain information or expedite an approval from Saudi officials.<sup>40</sup>

Set up originally for facilitating coordination and communication between CENTCOM and JFC, C<sup>3</sup>IC also became a focal

point for coordination between agencies internal and external to these two organizations. For personal or bureaucratic reasons, intelligence or other information might be slow to move between agencies, such as the Royal Saudi Air Force and the Royal Saudi Land Force, or between elements of MARCENT and ARCENT. C<sup>3</sup>IC often worked directly with relevant parties to effect needed exchanges of information. Some examples of the many organizations C<sup>3</sup>IC dealt with can be seen in Figure 2.41




FIGURE 2. C<sup>3</sup>IC COORDINATION RELATIONSHIPS

The C<sup>3</sup>IC was the primary theater level translation mechanism for working through dissimilarities between the Saudi and the American militaries. It has been characterized as a "fluid drive"

mechanism that could connect the fast paced and complicated Americans and their AirLand Battle operations with the Saudis and their different structure and experience, all without applying so much sudden stress that the US-Saudi military relationship would break down.<sup>42</sup>

The US liaison elements working with JFC subordinate units were another significant translation mechanism. Prime examples were the liaison teams with the two ad hoc headquarters for JFC-North and JFC-East, which included the bulk of the Islamic forces in the coalition. These teams, formed on an ad hoc basis and originally manned and equipped only for liaison duty, found it necessary to actively advise and assist the two JFC subordinate headquarters in the conduct of AirLand Battle operations and intelligence activities.<sup>43</sup> The teams' communication capabilities also proved invaluable as a backup to the Saudi systems, which were never designed for large scale mobile warfare. Finally, these teams provided needed independent information on JFC unit status and location that was used to balance official reports.

The Saudi-US coalition in Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM was quite successful. Iraq was militarily defeated and reduced as a regional threat to peace. Kuwait was liberated and its government restored. And most importantly for coalition purposes, the Saudi government seems as strong as ever, as is its relationship with the US.<sup>44</sup>

### III. REVIEW OF COALITION COMMAND AND CONTROL DOCTRINE

Now that historical coalition C<sup>2</sup> structures have been examined, a look at what doctrine currently offers the planner indicates that there seems to be no detailed, comprehensive published doctrine on structuring future coalition C<sup>2</sup>. What little is available is cursory, contained in at least four documents on other subjects, and is primarily aimed at describing combined organizations within existing formal alliances. There is little addressing a newly-formed coalition.

These documents also tend to assume that there will be an overall commander and single, hierarchical chain of command. For example, US Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations, states of combined operations: "Unity of command is essential in all operations."<sup>1</sup> Only JPUB 0-1, Basic National Defense Doctrine, as an initial draft, currently suggests that unity of effort may actually be the key, and that "unity of command may not be politically acceptable."<sup>2</sup> It also describes three components of unity of effort: common aim, coordinated planning, and establishment of trust and confidence among the allied participants. There is, however, nothing more in the way of guidelines or considerations for determining how to make the transition to specific situations.

This last limitation generally describes the depth of most of the remaining material found. The problem areas confronting a theater commander in combined operations that General Devers discussed are briefly mentioned in varying forms, but with little

to no discussion of their meaning and implications for coalition C2. The importance of liaison elements, language capability and coordination is also mentioned, but again with little depth and no mention of other peculiar requirements for liaison capability.

Several documents discuss logistics in multinational efforts and point out that there may be substantial differences in national capability, including disparities in mechanization of the societies and infrastructures of host nations. FM 100-5 specifically discusses combined logistics, suggesting that while supply has normally been a national responsibility, significant economy of effort may be gained by using a single combined supply agency. This agency might obtain and distribute common supplies such as petroleum, water, food, medical supplies, repair parts, and major end items for common equipment.<sup>3</sup> The potential need to shift one nation's supplies to another nation's forces to meet a theater priority of effort is not directly addressed, nor are the potential coalition political problems attendant to such actions.

All documents reviewed do mention that there will be differences in capability between each nation's militaries, and that mission assignment and the overall plan must take this into account to put friendly strengths against enemy vulnerabilities. There is also very brief discussion, given the above, about whether to organize the national forces in major subordinate commands in the theater along functional or service lines, or by geographic area. Guidelines for making such determinations are generally lacking. US Army Field Manual 101-5, Staff Organization

and Operations, assumes the existence of a combined staff, and the only guidance for its composition is that it should be balanced in terms of each nation's contribution to the theater.<sup>4</sup> Greater implications due to substantial disparities in national military capability and sophistication are not addressed.

JPUB 3-0, Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations (Test), in its chapter covering guidance to US CINCs serving as combined commanders, briefly covers two additional subjects. The first is the potential need of security assistance for an allied nation's military to be able to perform complementary missions within an alliance.<sup>5</sup> However, this is categorized as a peacetime training activity and there is no discussion of such security assistance as an operational activity in the accomplishment of wartime missions. The second is the establishment of bilateral arrangements for the conduct of operations with friends outside an alliance command structure. Considerations similar to General Devers' problem areas are listed, but with no discussion of their implications.<sup>6</sup>

The sparseness of combined C<sup>2</sup> doctrine may be due to a common conception that each alliance or coalition is so different that it warrants only general doctrinal discussion. For example, JPUB 0-1, Basic National Defense Doctrine, (Initial Draft) currently states under the heading of "Combined and Coalition Organization":

"There is no singular doctrine for combined warfare; each alliance develops its own protocols and contingency plans. Coalition operations are even less structured, based on temporary agreements or arrangements."<sup>7</sup>



While it is likely that each alliance and coalition will be different, this does not mean there is so little similarity that more definitive doctrine is not practical.

#### IV. ANALYSIS

This study now compares history with current doctrine to determine the extent of doctrinal discrepancies. This is done within the framework of differences in political and military needs, culture, logistical capability, military capability and selected aspects of C<sup>2</sup> structures.

##### DIFFERING POLITICAL AND MILITARY NEEDS

Government Legitimacy and Imminency of Threat. Two primary factors affect the balance of authority and power between a coalition nation and the US in structuring coalition C<sup>2</sup>. The first is the stability and internally perceived legitimacy of the partner government. This includes concerns over maintaining the appearance of sovereignty and the relative need to show independence from foreign powers. Second is the relative symmetry between the US and the partner in terms of imminency of the threat and the criticality of assistance from each other.

As discussed, neither factor was a serious issue with Britain in World War II. The former issue might have become one for the ROK in the Korean War if not overshadowed by the threat. On 17 July 1950, when ROK President Rhee placed the ROK Army under the command of General MacArthur, well over half of his country had been overrun by a massive invasion. The Kum River line was being

breached and Taejon was threatened. Rhee's army was in disarray and his only hope was the UN forces, especially those of the US. He was thus willing to subordinate his forces under the unilateral command of a US commander.

During Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM, Saudi Arabia was not so imminently threatened. The Saudi government could afford to consider political conditions (both internal and external) that made it dangerous to accept a US commander in either a combined or wholly subordinate command arrangement. This led to a C<sup>2</sup> structure with two separate, parallel lines of command that left Saudi Arabia officially subordinate to no one.

Doctrinal Implication. The factors of stability of the partner government and imminency of the threat do seem likely to affect the overall coalition C<sup>2</sup> structure. Doctrine does not address these factors or provide a more definitive base line for what US planners and decision makers might expect and realistically recommend in future situations.

#### CULTURAL DIFFERENCES

Language. The commonality and technical capability of a coalition partner's language must be compared with English. These were significant problems in the Korean War despite several years of effort. Even accurate translations did not always carry common implied meanings. This was not as serious, but was still a problem, between the US and Saudi Arabia in Operation DESERT

SHIELD/STORM. The US had to rely on Saudi soldiers at the theater level capable of speaking English.

Doctrinal Implication. Doctrine does address that there may be significant language differences, including technical terms. It also acknowledges that technical terms may not exist in both languages and will have to be developed, recommending this be done in advance as much as possible. Doctrine does not address the difficulty of developing common understanding of terminology during crisis or wartime operations. Neither does it warn of the ease with which some US terms can be misunderstood, especially those not well-defined in our own doctrine. Examples include the terms "defeat" and "destroy." The latter, if taken literally, could produce some very unfortunate events such as war crimes.

Cultural Friction and Personal Relationships. The factors of cultural and religious friction and the importance of personal relationships and trust have appeared prominently in history. General Eisenhower saw the establishment of trust and confidence as essential if allied leaders were to work together during World War II. This was somewhat of a problem in the Korean war, but was to some extent overcome by the imminency of the threat and the great dependence of the ROK on the US. In that the KMAG advisors, at all levels, needed to persuade rather than command their ROK Army counterparts, these considerations were still important.

These factors were key with Saudi Arabia in two ways. The first was the many restrictions needed for US troop behavior to conform to accepted local law and custom, such as limitations on

alcohol, entertainment and religious symbols. The second was the difficulty in conducting coordination with Saudi personnel unless a personal relationship and resulting trust were established. This was difficult to arrange for all US officers needing to work actions or get information from the Saudis.

Doctrinal Implication. The need for awareness of cultural and religious sensitivities, as well as the importance of establishing trust are mentioned in doctrine. Likely implications, as well as antipathy for foreigners and the possible key role of personal relationships are not discussed. Nor are the theater-wide implications of religious and cultural differences and the resultant impact on soldier morale of restrictions that may be necessary to accommodate those differences addressed.

Pride. "Face" or pride, and the partner's sense of self-esteem is another factor affecting operations. "Face" has caused some problems in accuracy of reporting in both the Korean War and Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM, especially if accuracy would have suggested failure. This required some capability for independent reporting, such as the liaison/advisory teams. In both conflicts these elements were usually deployed down to battalion level rather than the more conventional adjacent unit relationship.

The partner's need for self-esteem and mutual needs for legitimacy within the coalition require a fair distribution of missions and danger within the limits of each nation's capabilities. All must feel they are usefully contributing but

must also perceive that they are not being unfairly burdened while other coalition members do not equitably contribute or share the dangers. Balancing these political considerations with differing national capabilities may require that a partner's less capable (though still adequate) force be used when another member's force might have been more militarily suited. It may also be done despite greater costs in terms of support and C<sup>2</sup> resources than is gained in military capability. This occurred with some of the smaller coalition partners in both the Korean War and Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM.

Doctrinal Implication. The need for maintaining a partner's self-esteem is implicitly recognized in doctrine, but "face" and its possible impacts are not discussed. Neither are potentially wider requirements for liaison activities addressed, which include greater capability for independent verification and control efforts. There is also no discussion of the potential need to employ partner forces for mainly political reasons, and the accompanying need to structure missions and relationships to provide that partner an active role within their capability.

#### LOGISTIC CAPABILITY

Mechanization. Disparities between the US and a partner in terms of the mechanization of the partner's society and production ability of that nation were seen to varying extents in all three wars examined. This resulted in varying levels of relative dependence upon the US. These levels of dependence affected how

much authority those partners were willing to give to the US, which in turn affected the nature of the coalition C<sup>2</sup> structure they would accept.

Doctrinal Implication. Doctrine generally accounts for the material aspects of these disparities, making it clear that greater resources from the US may be required in certain areas, as well as specialization in areas of ability by the partner. There was no discussion of the effects upon coalition C<sup>2</sup> structure.

Theater Logistic Direction. The theater commander may direct combat and combat support assets toward a main effort, either planned or on an emergency basis, but the theater coalition C<sup>2</sup> structure may not allow the same to be done with national supplies to the practical extent of commonality. General Eisenhower did this in World War II and it was done in the Korean war, although both decisions had their political repercussions and complaints of favoring another nation.

Doctrinal Implication. Doctrine does not address this consideration explicitly, especially in terms of the political difficulties of centralizing control over something that has been viewed as "national" in nature. Nor does it discuss the problems of a coalition where one member reluctantly tolerates another member's presence, but will not share resources with that member.

#### DIFFERING ARMAMENTS, TRAINING AND DOCTRINE OF EACH ARMED FORCE

Differing Scope of Capability. There will possibly be a differential in scope or level of perspective among the coalition

militaries. The partner military may be a theater-wide combined arms and joint operations capable force, or more a constabulary/security force designed for the defensive. A key question is whether it is capable of large scale modern warfare or of easily thinking in such terms.

Both the ROK and Saudi Arabian militaries were different enough from that of the US in terms of level and type of organization, mission and capability, that such a significant differential did exist. This may have been less of a problem for Saudi Arabia given its longer history of training and schooling with the US, but the US intelligence and C<sup>2</sup> capabilities (to name two) are very sophisticated. KMAG and C<sup>3</sup>IC both worked to overcome such problems during the course of operations.

Doctrinal Implication. Different national force capabilities are accounted for and guidelines for planning appropriate employment against enemy strengths and weaknesses are discussed. However, there is no mention of the possibility of the differential being so great that the partner may have difficulty comprehending the scope of war the US might wage. This scope covers not only the type and complexity of operations, but the more difficult to discern implied tasks and tempo of execution.

Wartime Advisory and Assistance. An operational wartime advisory and assistance capability to increase the partner's military effectiveness in committed units is needed. The situation may not allow such units to be pulled out of operations for the conduct of training under administrative conditions. In

the Korean War, KMAC expanded its peacetime role and carried on advisory and assistance missions with committed ROK Army units from corps down to battalion. In Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM, similar efforts were put together using what were to have been liaison elements for JFC forces, from JFC-North and JFC-East headquarters down to their respective battalions. In both wars, these efforts went well beyond normal liaison activities, with substantial on-the-job-training and actual assistance in helping units to conduct their operations.

Doctrinal Implication. In neither war were these advisory and assistance tasks planned for in advance. This may be because doctrine addresses only peacetime advisory and assistance efforts.

Maturity of Relationship. The ability to work together may be increased by shared experience and training, despite a general lack of similarity and no formal military alliance relationship. Though there were problems, the coalition efforts would have been more difficult if there had been no military contact prior to the conflicts. The US Navy and Coast Guard had worked with the British Navy prior to December 1941. Both the ROK and Saudi Arabia had unit training and individual schooling activities with the US before their respective wars. While their militaries were dissimilar from the US military, their ability to understand and work with the US was increased.

Doctrinal Implication. Doctrine seems adequate in this respect. Bilateral military relationships and exercises outside alliance relationships are recognized doctrinally as important for



potential future operations, and are expected to be focused where possible on likely operational capabilities. Security assistance programs reinforce this.

#### NATURE OF COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURES

The nature of the theater coalition C<sup>2</sup> structure includes the overall organization of that structure and the translation mechanism used to bridge differences between coalition partners. This nature is a product of the relationship and similarity between those partners.

Command and Control Organization. The historical coalitions examined have shown three major theater coalition C<sup>2</sup> structures. The first is the well known combined structure with an integrated staff and possibly integrated subordinate units. This was reflected in the US World War II experience with the British and in current major US alliance systems. Second is the unilateral structure with a lead nation providing both the commander and the theater level staff, and giving direction to subordinate national forces as in the Korean War. Third is the parallel structure with no overall theater commander and staff, but rather separate and parallel commanders, staffs and chains of command for both nations as in Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Figure 3 shows a graphic comparison of the three theater C<sup>2</sup> structures.

Which C<sup>2</sup> structure to use is a major decision. The combined structure enhances coordination and cooperation and shares responsibility, but requires significant similarity or maturity in

the coalition. The unilateral structure may give the lead nation greater overall control, but also leaves that nation with overall responsibility for the outcome of operations and may not be acceptable to coalition partners. The parallel structure requires the greatest coordination to achieve unity of effort, but does give the partners greater freedom of action and less responsibility for each other's actions.




FIGURE 3. THEATER COALITION C2 STRUCTURES

Doctrinal Implication. In doctrine the emphasis is currently on combined structures and combined staffs, possibly because the two most extensive military alliances in which the US

participates, NATO and CFC, are organized this way. Unilateral and parallel coalition C<sup>2</sup> structures are not addressed, although future coalition members are unlikely to be as similar to the US as the British, or have as much working experience with the US as the partners in NATO or CFC.

Translation Mechanism. The extent to which planning, directing, controlling and coordinating can be done directly between partners' military commanders and staff, facilitated by liaison efforts, largely determines the nature of the translation mechanism. There may be a need for a "fluid drive" system such as operational wartime advisory and assistance organizations similar to KMAG, or something like C<sup>3</sup>IC.

Direct contact and a less obvious translation mechanism worked well in World II with the British. However, similarity between partners was unusually strong in that situation and the later Korean War and Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM saw sufficient dissimilarity between the US and coalition partners that specific translation mechanisms were required for effective planning, directing, controlling and coordinating.

Doctrinal Implication. There is no doctrinal mention of special translation mechanisms, or need for such, in coalition operations. Some related actions are implicit in combined staff and liaison elements, but there is no in-depth discussion of this.

Unity of Command vs Unity of Effort. A final consideration is whether unity of command or unity of effort is the priority for the coalition theater C<sup>2</sup> structure. For a coalition, unity of

command is not really gained by the official designation of a commander, or by what the wiring diagrams show, but rather by how much direction a commander is permitted to exercise over other coalition forces by the political leaders of those coalition forces. Unity of effort is therefore more a crucial issue in coalition C<sup>2</sup> than is unity of command. General Eisenhower generally had both, as he had both the title and political backing from Winston Churchill, the British Prime Minister. General Walker also had both in Korea. Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM was less obvious. There was unity of effort. There may also have been practical unity of command under General Schwarzkopf, but this was not explicit, and was not made so for political reasons.


Doctrinal Implication. Doctrinal references differ on this issue, leaving the primacy of unity of effort unclear.

#### V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The preceding comparison of current doctrine and historical coalitions has shown there is room for improvement of future doctrine concerning the establishment of theater coalition C<sup>2</sup>. There are common threads that run through history, illuminated by General Devers' problem areas, and some useful models of theater C<sup>2</sup> structures that can all be useful in analyzing future situations. If incorporated into doctrine, such models may assist the future C<sup>2</sup> planner in getting it more correct the first time.

## SPECTRUM OF SIMILARITY MODEL

This model is suggested here as a framework for assessing coalition partner similarity in order to design workable C<sup>2</sup> structures for future coalitions. This model uses the same factors for evaluation of similarity and differences as the previous chapter: differences in political and military needs, culture, logistical capability, and military capability and perspective. The level of similarity is then used as a predictor of the likely type of coalition C<sup>2</sup> structure, the extent of the translation mechanism needed, and the depth and level of the liaison effort that will be required (see Figure 4).



**FIGURE 4. SPECTRUM OF SIMILARITY**

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Partners of substantial similarity, especially in stability and military capability, are more able and likely to operate in a combined staff and theater C<sup>2</sup> structure. When the similarity is weak, especially if one partner has stability problems, a parallel C<sup>2</sup> structure is more likely as it preserves the appearance of independence, and the stronger partner may desire the greater freedom of action allowed by not having a combined structure. If the weaker partner is sufficiently threatened and is therefore very dependent upon the stronger partner, then a unilateral C<sup>2</sup> structure may be more likely. Or the weaker partner may simply be more comfortable with the unilateral lead of the stronger partner.

The robustness needed for the translation mechanism increases as similarity decreases. More effort and thought must go into this mechanism because the forces capable of separating the coalition partners and destroying unity of effort are greater. When similarity is low, extensive organizations such as large advisory and assistance elements or something like C<sup>3</sup>IC or both will be needed for operations to proceed.

A similar process occurs with liaison requirements. As similarity decreases, they take on more work than just the main job of coordination. This can progress to the point where liaison elements actually become advisory and assistance elements, whether they were trained, manned and equipped for it or not. Also likely to increase is the possibility of becoming the primary communication conduit between levels of command, as well as taking

on greater requirements for position and status verification and control activities for the theater headquarters.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDITIONAL DOCTRINE

Joint Doctrine. A joint publication on combined operations is needed. JPUBs 3-0 and 0-1 are good starts, but something as central to the US future conduct of warfare and conflict as coalition operations should be more explicitly and more thoroughly discussed. A joint publication on combined operations should be developed because future operations, aside from being coalition operations, will be joint as well. Furthermore, this is an area where the services need common doctrine and guidance to avoid misunderstanding.

C3IC Model. The Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM C<sup>3</sup>IC experience should be carefully documented and examined for the conditions in which it was useful and as a potential model for:

- centralizing established transnational personal relationships for use by outside agencies, and centralizing experience in conducting coalition coordination.
- the "fluid drive" aspect of bringing coalition staff members to a US level of operations expertise in terms of complexity, tempo and procedure. This potentially avoids the frustration of dealing with the primary US operational theater staff which, in crisis, may see itself as too busy to explain what is going on to the coalition staff members.

Cultural Differences. Doctrine should be modified to reflect the difficulty and limits of developing common practical understanding of terminology during crisis or wartime operations. It should also include discussion of theater-wide implications of religious and cultural differences and the impact on nonindigenous soldier morale of restrictions that may be required to accommodate those differences. Discussion of the potential need to employ partner forces for mainly political reasons, and the accompanying need to structure missions and relationships to provide that partner an active role within their capability, should be added.

Logistic Capability. Doctrine should explicitly address the need for a theater commander to be able to shift some national logistic resources from one nation to another to weight a main effort for the common good. Relevant political considerations should be included, such as national ownership of support and historic animosities among coalition members.

Wartime Advisory and Assistance. Doctrine must recognize the likely requirement for an operational wartime or crisis advisory/assistance effort for militaries with either no headquarters or limited experience with C<sup>2</sup> at echelons above the brigade level. The US has found this necessary in the Korean and Vietnam wars, as well as in Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM. As fewer militaries world-wide operate at anything like the US level of expertise, this requirement is likely to continue.



Unity of Command vs Unity of Effort. Doctrine should be modified to reflect that these concepts are not the same and that the latter is the key element for coalition operations.

Finally, the use of historical vignettes, when accompanied by analysis and resulting guidelines for future situations, is useful for doctrine in terms of providing practical insight to a future planner. One must caution, though, against such guidelines becoming prescriptive rather than suggestive. They should be meant only as a start point for further analysis of new situations, not an end point.

The future holds promise for combined operations doctrine, specifically as it addresses C<sup>2</sup>. The US Army is currently developing Field Manual 100-8, Combined Army Operations, and this study should provide that project with some assistance and basis for further thought. With US operations in coalitions the likely prospect for the future, fielded doctrine should not wait long.

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